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Abstract 
 
The United States v. Booker (2005) decision rendered Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory 
rather than mandatory.  In the context of this decision, this study examines both the direct 
influence of aggregate-level political, community and administrative variables on sentencing 
outcomes, and the way that such characteristics might contextualize individual-level predictors.  
Using multi-level regression techniques, this study examines the role of aggregate level variables 
on sentence length decisions across four distinct time periods.  Moreover, this article also 
examines whether aggregate-level variables condition the effects of race/ethnicity on sentencing 
outcomes.  While the direct effects of aggregate-level variables on sentencing outcomes are 
generally limited to political climate effects, there is evidence that political climate and other 
aggregate-level measures contextualize individual-level race/ethnicity effects.  Future research 
should seek to better understand the specific mechanisms behind these relationships. 
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines & United States v. Booker: Social Context and Sentencing 
Disparity 
Sentencing is an important phase of the criminal justice process.  At this stage, offenders 
who have been convicted of crimes are punished.  The goals of these punishments have been 
debated, but commonly they are described as deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
retribution (Gibbs, 1975; Packer, 1968).  Thus, if the broader goal of the criminal justice system 
is to address, and limit, criminal offending, the sentencing process is an important part of that. 
Within the empirical literature on the sentencing process, an important question has 
regarded the sources, extent, and manifestations of racial/ethnic disparity in sentencing.  In 
recent years, a large body of research has developed to investigate these issues.  This research 
examines not only which variables (e.g., criminal history, offense severity, type of offense) 
predict sentence severity, but also under which conditions they are most salient.  Moreover, this 
literature examines how much of the variation in sentencing outcomes is explained by 
race/ethnicity once these legal variables have been accounted for.  While many of the 
racial/ethnic differences are explained by legal characteristics, a racial/ethnic effect often persists 
net of these factors. 
More recently, researchers have examined how social contextual factors (e.g., political 
climate, community characteristics, and courtroom administration) influence racial disparity in 
sentencing (see Britt, 2000; Fearn, 2005; Wang & Mears, 2010).  Many of these studies have 
focused on state, as opposed to federal, sentencing (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; Ulmer, Light, 
& Kramer, 2011a for exceptions).  There are important differences between state and federal 
systems, including differences in the amount of discretion available to courtroom actors, often 
linked to the stringency of structured sentencing policies (e.g., sentencing guidelines).  This 
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creates a need for research which examines the intersection of social context and racial disparity 
in sentencing at the federal level. 
Particularly notable about the federal sentencing system are Supreme Court and policy 
decisions that have influenced the levels of discretion available to judges and prosecutors.  
Mostly notable is the United States v. Booker (2005) decision, which ruled that the mandatory 
nature of Federal Sentencing Guidelines was unconstitutional, and in violation of the 6th 
Amendment.  With this ruling, the Guidelines were made advisory rather than mandatory.  The 
Booker decision, along with other decision points over the past two decades (e.g., the PROTECT 
Act, and Gall v. United States [2007]) have provided important avenues for researchers to 
examine how the relationship between federal sentencing and racial disparity in sentencing 
outcomes has changed over time.   
An important part of this research is how much the factors that influence sentencing vary 
across U.S. district courts (see Ulmer et al., 2011a), and how the magnitude of those factors has 
changed over time.  One of the purposes of federal sentencing is to create fair, consistent, and 
uniform sentencing practices.  It is critical to understand how districts vary from each other in 
such a system.  Identifying such variation can allow legislators and policymakers to take steps 
toward ensuring fair, equitable sentencing. 
In this research, I examine the following research questions: Do social context variables, 
such as political climate, racial/ethnic composition, and administrative and organizational-level 
factors influence sentencing outcomes, and do they contextualize race/ethnicity effects on 
sentencing?  If so, do the effects vary across time-period?  Once the constraints on judicial 
discretion are loosened, judges may begin to take mitigating factors into account that they could 
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not in the past.  Thus, I argue that social context variables may contextualize individual-level 
variables (e.g., race/ethnicity) more strongly in the post-Booker periods.   
The importance of these questions is significant.  This research attempts to help 
researchers and policymakers better understand the complex origins of sentencing decisions, 
both in terms of social context and time period.  The results could help better understand how 
sentencing decisions are affected by both aggregate, district-level characteristics and policy 
shifts. 
Racial/Ethnic Disparity in State & Federal Sentencing 
 A large portion of the sentencing literature is devoted to racial/ethnic disparity (for 
reviews of this literature, see Chiricos & Crawford, 1995; Johnson & Lee, 2013; Mitchell, 2005; 
Spohn, 2000; Zatz, 1987).  Specifically, this literature examines whether racial/ethnic effects 
persist beyond controls for offense severity and criminal history.  Broadly, this body of research 
finds that racial/ethnic effects are mediated partially, but not completely, by the inclusion of legal 
characteristics.  Researchers have examined this type of disparity at both the state and federal 
levels (Albonetti, 1990; 1997; Kramer & Steffensmeier, 1993; Myers & Talarico, 1986; Spohn, 
2013; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Spohn & DeLone, 2000; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Spohn & 
Sample, 2013; Spohn, Welch, & Gruhl, 1985; Tonry, 1995; 1996; Unnever & Hembroff, 1988; 
Wooldredge, 2012; Wooldredge, Frank, Goulette, & Travis, 2015). 
 A number of studies have used the State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS) database to 
examine sentencing outcomes in state courts (Demuth and Steffensmeier, 2004; Jordan & 
Freiburger, 2010; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006).  These studies generally find less favorable 
treatment for Black and Hispanic offenders (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2006), with ethnicity 
effects strongest for drug offenses and race effects strongest for property offenses (Demuth & 
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Steffensmeier, 2004).  Moreover, Jordan and Freiburger (2010) find evidence of race/ethnicity 
effects for juveniles sentenced in adult court. 
 Other studies have used data from specific states to evaluate sentencing outcomes.  For 
example, using data from the Pennsylvania Commission of Sentencing (PCS), research indicates 
that young, Black males are the group that is most likely to be incarcerated and receive the most 
punitive sentences (Kramer & Steffensmeier, 1993; Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993; 
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998).  Moreover, Kramer and Ulmer (2002) find that young, 
Black males are also the least likely to receive downward departures in Pennsylvania. 
 Research using data from other state sentencing systems produce similar findings.  Using 
data from Michigan, Freiburger and Hilinski (2011) find that that sentencing outcomes were 
influenced more by race than probation officer recommendations.  Other studies using data from 
Florida find that non-White offenders were 6 to 8 times as likely as White offenders to receive 
custodial sanctions (Warren, Chiricos, & Bales, 2012), and non-White offenders 
disproportionately receive habitual-offender status (Crow & Johnson, 2008).  Moreover, studies 
using data from Georgia (Myers & Talarico, 1986), Ohio (Wooldredge, 2012), and Washington 
(Steen, Engen, & Gainey, 2005) find evidence of race effects above and beyond criminal history 
and offense severity.  Finally, studies comparing sentencing outcomes across Chicago, Miami 
and Kansas City (Spohn & DeLone, 2000; Spohn & Holleran, 2000) find that non-White males 
face the greatest odds of incarceration.  In short, studies using data from a variety of sources find 
racial and ethnic effects net of legally-relevant variables. 
 There is also a large body of research that has examined racial/ethnic disparity in 
sentencing at the federal level (Albonetti, 1990; 1997; Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Everett & 
Wojtkiewicz, 2002; Kautt & Spohn, 2002; Mustard, 2001; Nowacki, 2015; Rehavi & Starr, 
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2014; Spohn, 2013; Spohn & Sample, 2013; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; Tonry, 1995; 1996; 
Ulmer et al., 2011a).1  Similar to sentencing research in state courts, these studies find more 
punitive sentences from non-Whites, particularly young, non-White males (Doerner & Demuth, 
2010).  Specifically, Mustard (2001) finds more punitive sentences for Black offenders, in large 
part linked to the smaller likelihood of downward departures for these offenders.  Steffensmeier 
and Demuth (2006) find that Hispanic offenders are sentenced most harshly, particularly for drug 
offending.  Kautt and Spohn (2002) find that race conditions other variables differently across 
various types of sentencing strategies; Rehavi and Starr (2014) find more punitive sentences for 
Black offenders linked to charging decisions in earlier stages of the criminal justice process; and 
finally, Ulmer et al. (2011a) find evidence of racial disparity, but suggest that is has not 
expanded since the Federal Guidelines became advisory.  Taken together, this body of research 
suggests that race/ethnicity exert influence on federal sentencing outcomes above and beyond 
legal variables. 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines & United States v. Booker  
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were implemented in 1987 as a way to introduce 
more consistency and uniformity into federal sentencing.  Under these mandatory guidelines, 
judges were expected to evaluate offenders primarily on two criteria: offense gravity and 
criminal history.  Judges would consult a grid to find a range within which the offender should 
be sentenced (see Tonry, 1996).  This was an attempt to foster uniformity and consistency into 
sentencing. 
In the formative years of this era, the Guidelines were a work in process.  One of the 
goals of the Guidelines was to limit judicial discretion, and control the situations where judges 
would use extra-legal considerations to mitigate sentences.  One method for judges to mitigate 
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sentences was to apply downward departures, which allowed for sentencing below guideline 
ranges.  Upon evaluation, rates of departures were too high, so the Feeney Amendment of the 
PROTECT Act of 2002 further limited judges’ ability to apply these departures (see Friddle & 
Sands, 2004).   
Over time, the guidelines were met with challenges (Apprendi v. New Jersey, 2000; 
Blakely v. Washington, 2004).  In United States v. Booker (2005), the Federal Guidelines were 
challenged on constitutional grounds.  They were found to violate the 6th amendment and became 
advisory (see Frase, 2007), meaning that judges would have more flexibility to depart from 
Guidelines recommended sentences.  Judges would still calculate the sentences suggested by the 
Guidelines but had freedom to depart from them.  In essence, Booker expanded judicial 
discretion.  A number of researchers have examined changes to federal sentencing since Booker 
(see Fischman & Schanzenbach, 2012; Lynch & Omari, 2014; Nowacki, 2015; Starr & Rehavi 
2013; Ulmer et al., 2011a; Ulmer, Light, & Kramer, 2011b, United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2006; 2010; 2012). 
In 2007, two additional Supreme Court cases helped specify the circumstances under 
which judges could engage in downward departures: Gall v. United States and Kimbrough v. 
United States.  Gall ruled that judges should not automatically accept Guidelines 
recommendations as reasonable, and instead reach their own conclusions, informed by facts from 
specific cases.  Moreover, Kimbrough ruled that Guidelines recommendations were unreasonable 
in crack-cocaine related cases (Ulmer et al., 2011b).  
Social Context & Sentencing 
Although policy initiatives, such as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are meant to 
introduce uniformity, consistency, and fairness into sentencing, the effects of those policies can 
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vary across context.  Specifically, one might anticipate district-level variation in the effects of 
both legal and extra-legal characteristics on sentencing outcomes.  This variation is likely related 
to three concepts: 1) political climate; 2) racial/ethnic threat; and 3) courtroom communities and 
administration.   
Political Climate 
 
Over time, political climate has influenced social control in important ways (for a rich 
discussion, see Garland, 2001).  Broadly, research indicates that locales with more conservative 
political climates tend to utilize tighter social controls to constrain crime (Helms & Jacobs, 2002; 
Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1999).  To capture political context, these studies 
measure Republican party strength as the proportion of votes going to the Republican candidate 
in recent Presidential elections.   
 A conservative political climate generally represents a “law and order” approach to 
addressing crime.  More specifically, such a climate likely favors crime control over due process 
(Garland, 2001).  That is, punishing potential offenders becomes paramount.   Conversely, an 
approach that favors due process would allow for some offenders to go free, so long as those 
who are unjustly accused for crimes are not punished.  These conservative regimes are much 
more likely to dedicate resources to crime control,2 which may include expanding prison 
admissions, fortifying police forces, building new prisons, and de-emphasizing intermediate 
sanctions. 
Under a discretionary sentencing system, Federal judges are likely to consider the 
surrounding political climate, and sentence accordingly.3  In more conservative districts, judges 
may be less likely to apply downward departures, even when the option is available.  The 
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prospect of appellate review may deter some federal judges from engaging in departure 
sentencing altogether.   
This notion of political climate has been used to examine numerous social control 
outcomes, usually at the state-level.  Particularly at the sentencing stage, judicial decision-
making is likely influenced by political and social climates (Britt, 2000; Johnson, Ulmer, & 
Kramer, 2008).  Specifically, research finds that conservative political climates are associated 
with expansions in prison admissions (Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Jacobs & 
Jackson, 2010) and spending on corrections (Jacobs & Helms, 1999; Jacobs & Jackson, 2010). 
Moreover, quite often, political context interacts with individual-level offender characteristics, 
such as race/ethnicity and sex, to explain variation in criminal justice outcomes (Helms & 
Constanza, 2010; Helms & Jacobs, 2002).  For example, Helms and Jacobs (2002) found that 
African Americans and males tend to receive more punitive sanctions when they are sentenced in 
courts embedded within conservative political climates.  Similarly, Keen and Jacobs (2009) 
found that political climate interacts with aggregate-level racial composition to explain disparity 
in prison admissions, particularly in Southern states.  Taken together, this body of research 
speaks to more punitive climates in contexts where Republican party strength is most prominent. 
Racial & Ethnic Threat 
The influence of local context can extend beyond politics.  A variety of studies also look 
at aggregate-level compositional variables to examine variation across social control outcomes.  
In general, these studies are guided by Blalock’s (1967) minority-group threat hypothesis.  
Minority-group threat suggests that as minority groups accumulate size and access to resources, 
the dominant group feels threatened.  In response to this threat, the dominant group acts to 
tighten social controls against the growing minority-group.  This may include increasing police 
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presence, using more coercive police action against members of these groups, or sentencing 
more punitively. 
 Studies that examine the threat perspective and sentencing outcomes have offered mixed 
support.  For example, Bontrager, Bales, and Chiricos (2005) found that Black defendants are 
less likely to have adjudication withheld in places with higher property crimes rates and greater 
levels of concentrated disadvantage.  Moreover, other studies find that income inequality 
(Carmichael, 2005) and racial composition (Weidner, Frase, & Schultz, 2005; Wooldredge, 
2007) predict variation in sentencing outcomes.  Wang and Mears (2010) found that increasing 
levels of threat increased the odds of receiving a prison sentence when baseline levels of threat 
were high, and Greenberg and West (2001) found evidence of elevated imprisonment rates in 
states with larger Black populations.   
 Conversely, a number of studies do not fully support the threat perspective.  For example, 
Britt (2000) finds that sanctions tend to be more severe for all offenders, not just minority-group 
members, in places (in this case, court jurisdictions) with large Black populations.  Racial threat 
(measured by Black population size) did not appear to affect sentencing outcomes for habitual 
offenders (Crawford, Chiricos, & Kleck, 1998), for drug trafficking offenders (Kautt, 2002), or 
in large urban counties (Weidner, Frase, & Pardoe, 2004).  Feldmeyer and Ulmer (2011) found 
that Black population did not affect the sentencing of Black offenders, and that Hispanic 
defendants were actually sentenced more harshly in places with small Hispanic populations, and 
more leniently in places with the largest Hispanic populations.  Finally, Myers and Talarico 
(1987) found that all offenders, not just African Americans, are sentenced more harshly in 
jurisdictions with larger African American populations, which is inconsistent with Blalock’s 
hypothesis.  In short, with respect to sentencing, some studies find support for the racial/ethnic 
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threat perspective, while others do not, but even those that do not find support for threat do 
suggest variation in outcomes by place.   
Courtroom Communities & Organizational Efficiency 
 
 A final contextual consideration is the courtroom community.  Numerous local trends 
influence the courtroom community including correctional resources, caseloads, and norms and 
behaviors across courtroom actors.  In a broad sense, courtroom personnel (e.g., judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys) form courtroom workgroups (Eisenstein, Flemming, & 
Nardulli, 1988; Johnson, 2005; Kramer & Ulmer, 2009; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004).  These 
workgroups develop cultural norms and goals and often work in conjunction to achieve them.  
Such norms include “going rates” for sentences (Eisenstein et al., 1988), as well as interests in 
courtroom efficiency (Dixon, 1995; Engen & Steen, 2000).  In particular, Eisenstein et al. (1988) 
argue that sentences are less severe in larger court communities, tied to levels of autonomy, low 
visibility, and de-sensitization to crime and violence (see Kramer & Ulmer, 2009).  In short, 
courtroom communities are likely to condition other influences on sentencing outcomes. 
 An explicit purpose of the courtroom workgroup is to reach substantively rational 
sentences.  Structured sentencing systems (e.g., sentencing guidelines) represent a formally 
rational type of decision-making (Johnson, 2005; Ulmer et al., 2010; Ulmer & Kramer, 1996).  
Formally rational decision-making seeks to reach outcomes through process, procedure, and 
rules, such as those set by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Conversely, substantive rationality 
seeks to achieve specific outcomes linked to the individual characteristics of defendants 
(Savelsberg, 1992).  Generally, the courtroom workgroup seeks to achieve its goals and norms 
despite the formality of structured sentencing policy. 
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As such, one of the goals of the courtroom workgroup is to process cases quickly and 
efficiently in order to avoid a backlog of cases, thus local caseload is an important consideration 
for courtroom dynamics (Dixon, 1995; Engen & Steen, 2000).  In jurisdictions with heavy 
caseload pressure, offenders who accept plea negotiations are likely to receive more lenient 
sentences.  Conversely, offenders that go to trial in heavy-caseload jurisdictions can generally 
expect a “trial penalty” (Engen & Steen, 2000).  In short, courts form their own communities, 
and these communities have general goals and norms that can influence sentencing outcomes, 
and one of the most salient influences is caseload pressure. 
Current Study 
 The current study advances the understanding of sentencing outcomes by examining the 
effects of aggregate-level variables on sentencing outcomes.  More specifically, this study 
examines how political context, racial/ethnic threat, and administrative variables influence 
sentencing outcomes.  Moreover, it examines how these aggregate-level variables may condition 
the effect of individual-level extra-legal variables (e.g., race & ethnicity) on sentencing 
outcomes, and how these effects may vary over time.  As such, I examine the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Offenders sentenced in districts with a greater proportion of the population 
voting Republican, on average, receive harsher sanctions. 
Hypothesis 2: Offenders sentenced in districts characterized by larger Black and Hispanic 
populations are likely to receive harsher sentences (linked to minority-group threat). 
Hypothesis 3: Offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads are likely to receive 
more lenient sanctions than those sentenced in districts with lower caseloads (linked to 
organizational efficiency). 
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Cross-Level Interactions 
 Beyond the direct effects of district-level variables, I also expect that these contextual 
variables will interact with individual-level factors.  Previous research has found support for the 
notion that social context interacts with individual-level variables, particularly race/ethnicity 
variables (Bontrager et al., 2005).  Social context allows discretion to enter into the sentencing 
decision-making process, and as it does so, it is likely to influence the effect that extra-legal 
variables have on sentencing outcomes.     
Following the literature, I test cross-level interactions between race/ethnicity indicators at 
the individual-level and social context variables (e.g., political, threat, and organizational 
variables) at the aggregate level (see Bontrager et al., 2005; Helms & Jacobs, 2005; Wang & 
Mears, 2010).  Race/ethnicity is generally an important source of disparity in sentencing 
outcomes, and this is also where social context may influence judicial decision-making.  
Moreover, this selection of cross-level interactions represents both a parsimonious and 
theoretically meaningful approach to exploring the interactions between individual-level, extra-
legal variables, and aggregate-level contextual variables (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011, for 
example).  Therefore, I predict the following:   
Hypothesis 4: Non-White offenders sentenced in more politically conservative districts 
can expect particularly severe sentences relative to White offenders. 
Hypothesis 5: Non-White offenders sentenced in districts with larger non-White 
populations and more immigrant concentration can expect particularly severe sentences 
relative to White offenders. 
Hypothesis 6: Non-White offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads can 
expect particularly severe sentences relative to White offenders. 
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Data & Methods 
 
The present research draws on data from the Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences 
database from 1999-2008.  These data are compiled by the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) and include all convicted federal offenders from each of the 94 U. S. 
districts, making this dataset the most comprehensive available for federal offenses and 
offenders.4   
As noted earlier, these time periods reflect judicial discretion via the ability to issue 
downward departure sentences (see Ulmer et al., 2011b).  Prior to the PROTECT Act, federal 
judges had as much flexibility to issue departments as they had at any other time during the 
Federal Guidelines Era.  After the PROTECT Act, the ability to issue such departures was 
restricted.  Following the Booker decision, the discretion to apply downward departures was 
once again made available to federal judges, but the circumstances where those departures were 
most appropriate were unclear.  Finally, the Gall decision clarified some of these circumstances.  
Broadly, these time periods reflect proxies for the amount of discretion available to judges at the 
federal level.  Following previous research (see Ulmer et al., 2011a; 2011b), I partition the data 
into four distinct time periods: the pre-PROTECT period (1999-April 30, 2003), the post-
PROTECT period (May 1, 2003- January 11, 2005), the post-Booker period (January 12, 2005-
November 2007), and the post-Gall period (December 2007-2008). 
These data include information on sentence length, type of offense, criminal history, 
presumptive sentence, race/ethnicity, gender, district, education, and other legal and extra-legal 
variables.  Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. 
 I merged the USSC data with contextual variables that I computed using the 2000 Census 
and 2004 election data.  These variables are aggregated from the county-level to the district-
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level, as counties are cleanly imbedded within much larger districts.  In order to aggregate the 
data up to the district level, I calculated the district mean across all counties in the district.  
Undoubtedly, this will produce some measurement error; however, this is the most appropriate 
way to match Census data to federal court districts.  Few studies have attempted to match Census 
characteristics to federal districts to date (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011 and Kim, Cano, Kim, & 
Spohn, in press for notable exceptions).  Smaller geographical units, such as cities and counties 
are embedded within districts, but specific data on dependent variables are not available at this 
level.   
Dependent Variable 
 
 The dependent variable in this study is sentence length, measured in months.5  A zero-
month sentence reflects a non-custodial sanction, such as probation.  These sentences are 
excluded, since treating them as zero-month sentences would skew the data (see Ulmer et al., 
2011a).  Even after removing non-custodial sentences, this type of data tends to be highly 
skewed, so I take the natural log of sentence length (see also Steffensmeier et al., 1998) to adjust 
for the non-normal distribution of the data. 
Individual-Level Variables 
 
 I include a number of individual level (level 1) variables in the analysis.  The key 
variables of interest at the individual-level are measures or race/ethnicity.  These variables are 
measured using dummy variables for Black, Hispanic, and other race offenders, with White 
offenders serving as the reference category.  I also include measures of sex (female coded as 
“1”), age, education, citizenship status, and pre-trial release, criminal history, presumptive 
sentence, mode of disposition, and type of offense.  Age is a continuous variable, while 
education (coded as “1” if a high school degree or more was completed), citizenship status (non-
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citizens coded as “1”), and pre-trial release (coded as “1” if detained prior to sentencing) are 
dummy-coded.  Offense severity is measured using the natural log of the presumptive sentence, 
or minimum guideline recommendation (see Engen & Gainey, 2000).  Criminal history is an 
ordinal variable, ranging from 1-6.  Following previous research (Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011; 
Ulmer et al., 2011a), I anticipate that criminal history influences sentencing outcomes above and 
beyond its place in the presumptive sentence calculation, so I introduce a separate control.  Mode 
of disposition is coded as “1” if the defendant went to trial and otherwise “0.”  I also include 
dummy variables for three offense types: violent, drug, and immigration offenses.6 
Social Context Variables 
 
 The focus of this study is on aggregate-level, contextual variables.  Therefore, I estimate 
three aggregate-level factors: political climate, racial/ethnic threat, and organizational efficiency.   
Political climate is measured as the percentage of persons in a district who voted for the 
Republican candidate in the 2004 Presidential election.7  Racial/ethnic threat is measured using 
two variables: percent Black and percent Hispanic.8 Finally, I measure organizational efficiency 
by calculating the caseload in each district per judgeship.  I take the natural log of this variable to 
account for the non-normal distribution of caseloads across districts.  In addition to these 
measures, I control for the trial rate, percent of residents below the poverty line, and whether the 
district is a fast-track district (see Tillyer & Hartley, in press).  Contextual variables are grand-
mean centered. 
Analytic Strategy 
The analyses for social context variables utilizes linear mixed modeling techniques, with 
individual, case-level variables at level 1 and social context variables at level 2 for the 89 
districts.  Multi-level modeling is appropriate because the data in this study is structured in 
SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SENTENCING DISPARITY 18 
 
18 
 
groups (e.g., cases are nested within districts) where intercepts may vary (see Britt, 2000).  
Moreover, the hypotheses that I am testing require that individual- and aggregate-level data are 
estimated simultaneously.  Multi-level models act similar to a two-step model, but fit both steps 
at once (see Gelman & Hill, 2006).  Additionally, this technique produces efficient standard 
errors and controls for correlation between districts (West, Welch, & Galecki, 2006).  Failure to 
account for clustering could produce biased estimates (Gelman & Hill, 2006; West et al., 2006).  
I present a main effects model to test Hypotheses 1-3. 
I also examine cross-level interactions, focusing on the interaction between race/ethnicity 
at level-1 and certain district-level variables at level 2.  I include cross-level interactions between 
Black and Hispanic offenders for each of the primary level 2 variables of interest: political 
climate, racial/ethnic threat, and caseload.  These techniques allow me to estimate the extent to 
which race/ethnicity effects are conditioned by social contextual variables.  These cross-level 
interaction models test Hypothesis 4-6.  In all models, I also control for sentencing year by 
including a set of dummy variables (not shown in tables).  This accounts for non-independence 
across sentencing year. 
Results 
 
 Intercept-only models are presented in Table 2.  These models present intra-class 
correlations (ICCs), which illustrate the proportion of variation in the dependent variable (e.g., 
sentence length) explained by the level 2 (e.g., district) unit.  These calculations indicate that the 
proportion of variation explained at the district-level generally increases over time, with ICCs 
ranging from .062-.083, which represents between 6-8 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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 Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  Broadly, results from the individual-level 
predictors conform to findings from previous literature (Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Spohn, 2013; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).  In particular, Black and Hispanic 
offenders and male offenders receive more punitive sentences than White and female offenders, 
and offenders with more extensive prior records and who committed more serious offenses are 
sentenced more punitively.  Moreover, offenders who go to trial receive more punitive sentences 
than those who enter plea negotiations, and offenders detained prior to trial receive longer 
sentences as well.  Offenders with at least a high school diploma receive more lenient sentences 
than those without a diploma, and immigration offenders receive shorter sentences, on average.  
The direction and significance of these results hold across time period.   
 Hypotheses 1 predicts that offenders sentenced in more politically conservative climates, 
on average, receive more punitive sanctions.  Results indicate that offenders sentenced in these 
politically conservative districts do receive more punitive sentences in each time period.  
Hypothesis 1 receives support across time.  Previous studies have produced similar findings (see 
Jacobs & Helms, 2001; Jacobs & Helms, 1996; Jacobs & Jackson, 2010). 
 Hypothesis 2 suggests that offenders sentenced in districts with larger non-White 
populations (e.g., percent Black and percent Hispanic) receive longer sentences.  The measures 
of percent Black and percent Hispanic were not statistically significant in any of the time 
periods.  Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 posits that offenders sentenced in districts with larger caseloads per 
judgeship receive more lenient sentences.  The measure of caseload was not statistically 
significant in any time period.  Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  In terms of main effects, 
only the percent voting Republican variable influences sentence length decisions. 
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 The remaining hypotheses examine cross-level interactive effects between individual race 
and ethnicity, and the district level measures discussed above.  Results from models testing these 
hypotheses are presented in Table 4.  Specifically, Hypothesis 4 predicts that non-White 
offenders sentenced in politically conservative districts receive particularly harsh sentences.  
Results indicate that Black offenders sentenced in more politically conservative districts receive 
more lenient sentences in the post-PROTECT and post-Booker time periods, but not the pre-
PROTECT or post-Gall time periods.  Recall that the post-PROTECT period was a time when 
the avenues for applying downward departures were more limited, so this result is somewhat 
unexpected.  On the other hand, Hispanic offenders sentenced in conservative districts receive 
more lenient sentences only in the post-Booker and post-Gall time periods.  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.   
 Hypothesis 5 suggests that Black offenders sentenced in districts with large Black 
populations and Hispanic offenders sentenced in districts with large Hispanic offenders will 
receive more punitive sentences.  In the post-PROTECT and post-Booker time periods, Black 
offenders sentenced in districts with large Black populations do receive longer sentences, but 
there is no statistically significant interaction in the pre-PROTECT or post-Gall period.  Again, 
the post-PROTECT period is when downward departures sentences were less prevalent, so one 
would expect more punitive sentences during this era.  Moreover, Hispanic offenders sentenced 
in districts with large Hispanic populations are sentenced more leniently in each time period.  
Thus, Hypothesis 5 receives partial support: it is supported for Black offenders in only the post-
PROTECT and post-Booker periods.  It is possible that the effects of the post-PROTECT period 
(e.g., fewer downward departures) spilled over into the post-Booker period, explaining this 
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result.  The finding that aggregate-level racial composition interacts with individual-level racial 
status reflects previous research findings (see Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). 
 Finally, Hypothesis 6 posits that non-White offenders receive more lenient sentences in 
districts with greater caseload pressure.  Results indicate that caseload does not have any 
moderating effect on Black offenders in any time period.  On the other hand, Hispanics receive 
more lenient sentences in each time period.  Hypothesis 6 is not supported.  Taken together, 
these results provide support for the main effect of political conservatism, and mixed support for 
cross-level interactions.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
  
 The majority of studies on sentencing focus on the individual characteristics of offenders.  
In contrast, this study examined both the direct influence of social contextual variables on 
sentencing outcomes, and how these variables might condition the effects of individual 
characteristics.  Broadly, the results in this paper suggest that some of these variables do 
influence sentencing outcomes.  Moreover, in certain situations, they condition the effects of 
individual-level variables, sometimes conforming to expectations, other times not. 
 The main effect analyses showed that sentences are generally more punitive in districts 
with conservative political climates.  In each time period, the percentage of Republican votes 
was associated with longer sentences.  This finding conforms with previous research, which 
suggests that political conservatism is consistent with a “law and order” approach to social 
control (Garland, 2001; Helms & Jacobs, 2002).  Judges in these districts are more likely to 
emphasize the retributive nature of punishment, and sentencing in particular.  Conversely, 
measures of racial/ethnic composition, and caseload did not influence sentencing outcomes.  
These results do not speak well to the racial/ethnic threat perspectives (Blalock, 1967) or the 
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organizational efficiency perspective (Dixon, 1995; Engen & Steen, 2000).  These results were 
uniform across time period. 
 The cross-level interactions produced interesting contingencies to these results.  In 
particular, Black offenders sentenced in conservative political climates were sentenced more 
leniently in the post-PROTECT and post-Booker periods, and Hispanic offenders sentenced in 
conservative districts were sentenced more leniently in both the post-Booker and post-Gall 
periods.  These findings do not conform to expectations about conservative districts.  It is 
possible that in light of attention drawn to racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice 
system, judges in these districts have altered sentencing practices to address widespread 
concerns.  It would be interesting to know whether (and to what extent) large-scale perceptions 
about disparity in the criminal justice system influence judicial decision making. 
 The racial/ethnic interactions also produced interesting results.  Black offenders 
sentenced in districts with larger Black populations received more punitive sentences in the post-
PROTECT and post-Booker periods, while Hispanic offenders received more lenient sentences 
in each time period.  The result for Black offenders conforms to the racial threat perspective, and 
represents a more robust test than population composition alone.  Conversely, the results 
regarding Hispanic offenders refute the ethnic threat perspective.  This study is not the first to 
fail to find evidence of ethnic threat (see Feldmeyer & Ulmer, 2011, for example).9  Others have 
argued that Hispanic population can actually serve as a protective factor (Sampson, 2006), where 
large Hispanic populations can make places safer.   
 Finally, measures of caseload did not produce significant interactions with Black 
offenders, but Hispanic offenders sentenced in districts with higher caseloads were sentenced 
more leniently in each time period aside from the post-Gall period.  Approximately 21 percent of 
SOCIAL CONTEXT AND SENTENCING DISPARITY 23 
 
23 
 
the districts in the data are fast-track districts (Table 1), but these interactions persist net of 
controls for both those types of districts and immigration offenses.  Judges in these districts may 
sentence more leniently to combat the perception that stereotypes are often attributed to Hispanic 
offenders (Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).  This result provides support for the organizational 
efficiency perspective.  Taken together, the cross-level interactions suggest that individual 
characteristics in sentencing are often moderated by social contextual factors.  Accounting for 
social context in this way can lead to conclusions that are not clear from a less nuanced, broader 
picture. 
 It is important to note that effect sizes of the social context variables are small compared 
to those of the individual-level variables.  Engen (2011) cautions against relying too heavily on 
statistical significance, when the substantive effects may be small.  Even with small effects, 
however, the interactions produced in this study are interesting and merit further investigation, 
not only at the federal level but also in state courts. 
 Many of the interactions only achieved statistical significance in a few of the time periods 
examined, highlighting the importance of partitioning the data.  It was particularly interesting 
that the proportion of variation explained at the district-level grew over the course of the study, 
peaking at over 8% in the post-Gall period.  It is clear that many social context variables were 
not examined in this study.  Future research should attempt to further explain the precise 
mechanisms affecting sentencing at the aggregate level, particularly given that the role of inter-
district variation appears to be growing over time. 
Future research should continue to examine aggregate-level influences of sentencing at 
both the state and federal levels.  The literature requires further development, where we can 
better understand how and when concepts such as political conservatism, threat, and 
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organizational efficiency are important.  While we have a foundation to conduct this type of 
research, it is important that these frameworks continue to grow.  One important limitation of 
this study was the aggregation strategy used to match Census variables to districts. Since many 
of the districts cover large areas, and sometimes an entire state, these variables are much less 
telling than they might be at a smaller unit of analysis, such as the tract-level.  For example, a 
variable such as percent below the poverty line is aggregated for the entire district.  This means 
that concentrated levels of disadvantage will be mitigated by areas of relatively low disadvantage 
to produce a middle ground.  Moreover, it might not make sense to assume that disadvantage that 
occurs in a certain pocket of a district could affect sentencing outcomes throughout the entire 
district.   
 Individual judicial characteristics was an important element missing from this study.  
While this study did include measures of political conservatism, it is not clear to what extent 
federal judge appointments match the voting behavior in the districts.  It is important that federal 
courts achieve symbolic representation (Welch, Combs, & Gruhl, 1988) for the offenders who 
are sentenced, such that characteristics of the judges in some ways match characteristics of the 
offenders coming before them.  These characteristics may include politics, but also ascribed 
statuses such as race/ethnicity and gender.  Further research should examine the link between 
substantive representation and sentencing outcomes.  
 This study speaks to the influence of social context on Federal sentencing decisions.  
Both the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) and the state-level commissions (and the 
Supreme Court) must continually re-assess the goals of sentencing and punishment and whether 
they are being achieved.  If those goals are met better in some districts than others, adaptations 
are necessary.  Landmark decisions such as Booker and Gall represent some of these changes, 
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but others may be necessary.  Even though policy, such as mandatory minimums and sentencing 
guidelines, are meant to foster consistency and uniformity in sentencing, they are often 
connected to even greater disparities.  It is crucial that research and policy are linked to the 
extent that they accomplish the necessary goals of punishment.   
Notes
1 The distinction between state and federal sentencing is an important one, because the federal 
system is bound to policy that many states are not, which influences the level of discretion 
available in the federal and state systems.  Specifically, the federal system are bound by Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines (even in their current, advisory form).  While some states may have 
guidelines systems, others may not, but even those that do vary to the extent that those systems 
constrain judicial discretion (Tonry, 1996).     
 
2 An anonymous reviewer noted that the federal system is a national institution, and all district 
courts receive resources from the Department of Justice.  This is true, however, while those 
national resources might not vary, the allocation of resources might vary, even in structured 
sentencing systems (Wilhelm & Turner, 2002).   
3 Although Federal judges are appointed rather than elected, it is still reasonable to think that 
political climate could affect their sentencing decisions, particularly through public opinion (see 
Benesh, 2006; Caldeira, 1986; 1987; Levin, 1972).  While they do not have to conform to voters, 
they also do not want to cause disturbances with those who appoint them.  Moreover, it is likely 
that the general political climate affects these decisions subconsciously rather than explicitly.  
That is, political climate may affect judicial decision making without judges even realizing it. 
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4  I include 89 of the 94 districts in my analyses (excluding territories and other districts not 
included in the U. S.).  These districts are missing data on level-2 measures, and could not be 
included. 
 
5 I also attempted to estimate models treating non-government sponsored downward departures 
as a second dependent variable.  Unfortunately, this variable did not show sufficient variation 
during the post-PROTECT period, as only 5% of cases were resolved in this way during that 
timeframe.  Thus, only sentence length models are presented. 
6 Numerous studies of federal sentencing exclude immigration offenses from analyses (see 
Doerner & Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).  However, as an anonymous 
reviewer noted, some immigration offenders sentenced in “fast-track districts” are allowed to 
waive certain rights in exchange for sentencing departures.  Rather than excluding these 
offenses, I chose to model both immigration offenses as a level 1 variable, and fast-track districts 
as a level 2 variable. 
7 I use the 2004 election as a benchmark because it most closely represents the midpoint of my 
data, and it is temporally proximate to the Booker decision. 
8 I also tested for a possible quadratic relationship for these variables.  These quadratic terms 
failed to reach statistical significance in any model, so the analysis with the linear term is 
presented in the interest of simplicity. 
 
9 Also note that the racial/ethnic threat perspective most closely corresponds to smaller units of 
analyses, such as census tracts or neighborhoods.  While the application here is an imperfect one, 
it is still important to examine the extent to which threat processes may influence federal (and 
state) sentencing outcomes. 
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Tables 
Table 1   
 
Descriptive Statistics (Mean Value with Standard Deviation in Parentheses) 
   Pre-
PROTECT 
Post-
PROTECT 
Post-Booker Post-Gall 
Dependent Variable     
Sentence Length (in months) 49.77 
(58.43) 
51.20 
(59.52) 
54.01 
(61.48) 
51.75 
(60.89) 
Level 1 Independent Variables     
Black .25 
(.43) 
.22 
(.42) 
.23 
(.42) 
.22 
(.42) 
Hispanic .42 
(.49) 
.43 
(.50) 
.43 
(.50) 
.41 
(.49) 
Other .03 
(.18) 
.04 
(.19) 
.04 
(.19) 
.03 
(.18) 
Female .12 
(.33) 
.12 
(.32) 
.12 
(.32) 
.11 
(.31) 
Age 33.93 
(10.46) 
34.12 
(10.38) 
34.61 
(10.50) 
34.69 
(10.56) 
Criminal History 2.44 
(1.72) 
2.56 
(1.76) 
2.57 
(1.75) 
2.55 
(1.74) 
Presumptive Sentence 62.26 
(217.71) 
64.44 
(305.25) 
73.87 
(387.57) 
72.34 
(406.14) 
Trial .04 
(.20) 
.04 
(.20) 
.04 
(.21) 
.04 
(.18) 
Violent Offense .01 
(.10) 
.01 
(.10) 
.01 
(.10) 
.01 
(.10) 
Drug Offense .44 
(.50) 
.38 
(.49) 
.38 
(.48) 
.35 
(.48) 
Detained Prior to Sentencing .65 
(.48) 
.71 
(.45) 
.73 
(.44) 
.76 
(.43) 
Education .56 
(.50) 
.54 
(.50) 
.54 
(.50) 
.54 
(.50) 
Non-U.S. Citizen .36 
(.48) 
.38 
(.49) 
.39 
(.49) 
.43 
(.49) 
Immigration Offense .20 
(.40) 
.25 
(.43) 
.26 
(.44) 
.30 
(.46) 
Level 2 Independent Variables     
Percent Republican 56.52 
(9.38) 
57.03 
(9.44) 
57.22 
(9.19) 
57.34 
(8.87) 
Percent Black 8.73 
(9.89) 
8.56 
(10.15) 
8.51 
(10.00) 
8.60 
(9.99) 
Percent Hispanic 17.60 
(16.65) 
17.71 
(16.66) 
17.46 
(16.66) 
18.29 
(17.21) 
Caseload 418.95 
(330.54) 
317.92 
(245.67) 
572.75 
(447.30) 
184.16 
(158.12) 
Trial Rate 95.99 
(2.03) 
96.05 
(2.03) 
96.02 
(2.01) 
96.06 
(2.00) 
Percent Living Below Poverty Line 14.90 
(4.06) 
15.12 
(4.12) 
15.15 
(4.17) 
15.24 
(4.17) 
Fast Track District .21 
(.41) 
.21 
(.41) 
.21 
(.41) 
.21 
(.41) 
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Table 2  
 
Inter-Class Correlations for Sentence Length Models 
 
     Pre-
PROTECT 
Post-
PROTECT 
Post-
Booker 
Post-
Gall 
 
Intercept     .334*** 
(.025) 
.349*** 
(.026) 
.346*** 
(.026) 
.383*** 
(.029) 
 
Residual     1.299*** 
(.002) 
1.259*** 
(.003) 
1.275*** 
(.002) 
1.269*** 
(.004) 
 
Intra-Class 
Correlation 
  .062*** 
(.009) 
.071*** 
(.010) 
.068*** 
(.010) 
.083*** 
(.012) 
 
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001 
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Table 3.   
 
Multi-Level Regression Models for Sentence Length. 
     Pre-
PROTECT 
Post-
PROTECT 
Post-
Booker 
Post-Gall 
Level 1 Variables        
Black    .060*** 
(.004) 
.049*** 
(.005) 
.062*** 
(.004) 
.086*** 
(.008) 
Hispanic    .026*** 
(.004) 
.019** 
(.006) 
.039*** 
(.005) 
.029** 
(.009) 
Other    .043*** 
(.008) 
.046*** 
(.011) 
.035*** 
(.008) 
-.008 
(.016) 
Female    -.189*** 
(.004) 
-.174*** 
(.006) 
-.183*** 
(.005) 
-.164*** 
(.009) 
Age    -.0003* 
(.0001) 
-.0004* 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0001) 
-.001* 
(.0003) 
Criminal History    .030*** 
(.001) 
.026*** 
(.001) 
.033*** 
(.001) 
.038*** 
(.002) 
Presumptive Sentence (ln)  .794*** 
(.002) 
.785*** 
(.002) 
.784*** 
(.002) 
.761*** 
(.003) 
Trial  .311*** 
(.007) 
.294*** 
(.009) 
.275*** 
(.007) 
.271*** 
(.015) 
Violent Offense  .103*** 
(.014) 
.073*** 
(.019) 
.007 
(.015) 
.047 
(.028) 
Drug Offense  -.027*** 
(.004) 
-.024*** 
(.005) 
-.025*** 
(.004) 
-.006 
(.007) 
Detainment Status  .289*** 
(.003) 
.287*** 
(.005) 
.347*** 
(.004) 
.370*** 
(.008) 
High School Graduate  -.025*** 
(.003) 
-.025*** 
(.004) 
-.020*** 
(.003) 
-.028*** 
(.006) 
Non-U.S. Citizen  -.023*** 
(.004) 
-.039*** 
(.006) 
-.033*** 
(.005) 
-.008 
(.009) 
Immigration Offense  -.083*** 
(.005) 
-.070*** 
(.007) 
-.090*** 
(.006) 
-.113*** 
(.010) 
Level 1 Intercept  1.917** 
(.603) 
1.782** 
(.649) 
2.429** 
(.731) 
2.632*** 
(.732) 
Level 2 Variables       
Percent Voting Republican   .005*** 
(.001) 
.006*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.001) 
.009*** 
(.001) 
Percent Black     .001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.0002 
(.001) 
.002 
(.001) 
Percent Hispanic   -.003 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
Caseload Per Judge (ln)    .011 
(.025) 
.027 
(.026) 
.024 
(.029) 
.023 
(.026) 
Trial Rate    -.17** 
(.006) 
-.016* 
(.007) 
-.024** 
(.008) 
-.024** 
(.008) 
Percent Below Poverty Line   .003 
(.003) 
.004 
(.004) 
.004 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
Fast Track District   -.067 
(.035) 
-.054 
(.038) 
-.082 
(.042) 
-.090** 
(.042) 
Level 2 Intercept   .095*** 
(.007) 
.102*** 
(.008) 
.116*** 
(.009) 
.113*** 
(.009) 
Level 2 Residual   .605*** 
(.001) 
.543*** 
(.001) 
.597*** 
(.001) 
.601*** 
(.002) 
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001 
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Table 4.   
 
Multi-Level Logistic Regression Models for Cross-Level Interactions for Sentence Length. 
     Pre-
PROTECT  
Post-
PROTECT 
Post-
Booker 
Post-Gall 
POLITICAL       
Level-1 Variables       
Black   .060*** 
(.004) 
.049*** 
(.005) 
.061*** 
(.004) 
.086*** 
(.008) 
Hispanic   .025*** 
(.004) 
.019** 
(.006) 
.038*** 
(.005) 
.028** 
(.009) 
Level-2 Variable       
Percent Republican   .005*** 
(.001) 
.006*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.001) 
.010*** 
(.001) 
Political Interactions      
Black x Percent Republican  -.0005 
(.0003) 
-.001* 
(.0005) 
-.002*** 
(.0004) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Hispanic x Percent Republican  -.0001 
(.0003) 
.0003 
(.0004) 
-.001* 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
COMMUNITY       
Level-1 Variables       
Black   .059*** 
(.004) 
.046*** 
(.005) 
.060*** 
(.004) 
.086*** 
(.008) 
Hispanic   .035*** 
(.005) 
.037*** 
(.007) 
.052*** 
(.006) 
.047*** 
(.011) 
Level-2 Variables       
Percent Black   .001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.007*** 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
Percent Hispanic  -.003 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
Community Interactions     
Black x Percent Black  .0004 
(.0002) 
.001*** 
(.001) 
.001*** 
(.0003) 
.0003 
(.001) 
Hispanic x Percent Hispanic -.001*** 
(.0002) 
-.001*** 
(.0003) 
-.001*** 
(.0002) 
.002** 
(.0005) 
ADMINISTRATIVE       
Level-1 Variables       
Black   .092** 
(.035) 
.085* 
(.040) 
.095* 
(.036) 
.065 
(.052) 
Hispanic   .191*** 
(.028) 
.218*** 
(.010) 
.240*** 
(.029) 
.025*** 
(.042) 
Level-2 Variable       
Caseload (ln)   .013 
(.023) 
.030 
(.026) 
-.026 
(.029) 
.021 
(.026) 
Administrative Interactions      
Black x Caseload  -.005 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.008) 
-.006 
(.006) 
.005 
(.011) 
Hispanic x Caseload  -.026*** 
(.004) 
-.036*** 
(.006) 
-.033** 
(.005) 
-.047 
(.009) 
Note.  Analysis also controls for all Level-1 Variables (not shown) 
* p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001 
